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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from a ruling of 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") 
Appeals Board.  The Board upheld a ruling by the Secretary of HHS 
that reduced the amount of funding for child support enforcement 
activities in Pennsylvania by the total amount of revenue 
generated by a Judicial Computerization Fee ("JCP Fee") assessed 
on each child support case filed in the Commonwealth.  
 The district court granted summary judgment against the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  ("DPW" or "Commonwealth") and in 
favor of HHS, the United States, and the HHS Appeals Board 
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(collectively the "defendants"), and this appeal followed.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the ruling of the 
district court.  
   
I. BACKGROUND 
 In 1975, Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement Act, 
which is incorporated into the Social Security Act as "Title IV-
D."  See 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.  Under Title IV-D, the federal 
government provides funding through HHS to participating states 
to assist in obtaining and enforcing child and spousal support 
obligations, locating absent parents, and establishing paternity. 
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 655.  The United States currently pays each 
state 66 percent of the "total amounts expended by such State 
during such quarter for the operation of the plan," and 90 
percent of other specified expenses.  42 U.S.C §§ 655(a)(1)(A), 
(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C), and (a)(2)(C).  The Title IV-D program 
complements the federal-state Aid to Families with Dependant 
Children program under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act 
("AFDC") and is intended to reduce state and federal expenditures 
often necessitated by the failure of noncustodial parents to meet 
their support obligations. 
 In order to participate in the Child Support Enforcement 
program, each state must submit a plan for HHS approval in which 
the state designates the specific organizational unit or agency 
responsible for administering the program -- i.e. "the IV-D 
agency."  See 42 U.S.C. §654(3).  The plan must provide, inter 
alia, that the state will undertake, when necessary, to establish 
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the paternity of children, to locate absent parents, and to 
collect financial support for children through various means, 
such as wage withholding, property liens, withholding of 
unemployment compensation, and interception of tax refunds.  See 
42 U.S.C. §§ 654(4), (5), (6); 664; 666(a)(1), (3), (4), (b)(1), 
(8). 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a participant in the 
Child Support Enforcement program and thus receives Title IV-D 
funding from the federal government.  The Pennsylvania Department 
of Public Welfare ("DPW") is the designated IV-D agency under the 
Commonwealth's operating plan.  However, Pennsylvania's Title IV-
D program is administered by the Domestic Relations Section of 
each county Court of Common Pleas under a cooperative agreement 
with the Department of Public Welfare.   
 In 1981, Congress enacted § 455(a) of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 655(a), which requires states participating in 
the Child Support Enforcement program to reduce their claims for 
Title IV-D reimbursement by an amount "equal to the total of any 
fees collected or other income resulting from services provided 
under the plan approved under this part."  Thereafter, the 
Secretary of HHS promulgated a regulation implementing this 
"program income" exclusion of 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1).  See 45 
C.F.R. § 304.50.  That regulation provides that: 
 The IV-D agency must exclude from its quarterly 
expenditure claims an amount equal to: 
 
 (a)  All fees which are collected during the 
quarter under the title IV-D State plan; and 
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 (b)  All interest and other income earned during 
the quarter resulting from services provided under the 
IV-D State plan. 
 
45 C.F.R. § 304.50.   
    
 In 1990, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a law that 
imposes the aforementioned $5.00 JCP fee on all initial court 
filings.  That fee was enacted in order to provide a dedicated 
funding source for the computerization of Pennsylvania's courts. 
In child support cases, the JCP fee is collected by either the 
Domestic Relations section of the particular court, or the 
Prothonotary, and these offices hold the fee in trust for the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The parties here agree that this fee 
cannot be used for child support purposes and must, instead, be 
transferred to the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue which makes 
the money available to the Supreme Court for computerization of 
the courts.  This court computerization program does not, 
however, include the computerization of the child support system 
which is funded by other sources.   
 Upon learning of the JCP fee, the Secretary of HHS announced 
that she would consider the fee collected on IV-D cases to be 
"program income" under the Title IV-D program because the fee 
"resulted from" child support services.  Accordingly, in 1993, 
the Secretary notified the Commonwealth that HHS was disallowing 
a total of $102,241 in claims that Pennsylvania had made for 
federal funding under the Child Support Enforcement program.  The 
Secretary's disallowance letters explained that because this 
extra $5.00 court filing fee is collected "as a direct result of 
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the applicant's request for IV-D services, the fee results from 
services provided under the IV-D State plan."  The letters 
further explained that, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) 
and 45 C.F.R. § 304.50, HHS was treating the JCP fees collected 
in connection with child support and paternity actions as program 
income that reduces net expenditures for purposes of funding 
under the Title IV-D program.   
 The Commonwealth appealed these disallowances to the HHS 
Appeals Board.  The Commonwealth challenged the Secretary's 
conclusion that the funds in question were "program income" as 
the funds could only be used for computerization, and 
furthermore, the computerization did not even include 
computerization of the court's domestic relations activities. The 
Commonwealth also challenged the Board's authority to adjudicate 
the appeal.  The Commonwealth argued that the members of the 
Board were appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause of 
the United States Constitution, U.S.C.A. Const. Art 2, § 2, 
cl.2., and that the appointment was also in violation of civil 
service regulations thus invalidating any action taken by the 
Board.   
A. Proceedings Before the HHS Appeals Board. 
 The Secretary of HHS created the HHS Appeals Board in the 
early 1970's by a regulation promulgated under 45 C.F.R. Part 16. 
The regulation gave the Board the responsibility of resolving 
disputes such as the one now before us.  Congress thereafter gave 
the Board additional authority including the ability to resolve 
quality control disputes under the AFDC program of Title IV-A. 
7 
See 42 U.S.C. § 608(j). The Appeals Board is comprised of a 
Chairperson and four full-time Board members.  The Secretary 
appoints each of the members of the Board.  
 The Appeals Board rejected the Commonwealth's challenge to 
its authority, and also rejected the Commonwealth's argument that 
the JCP fee is not IV-D "program income" under 42 U.S.C. 
§655(a)(1), and 45 C.F.R. § 304.50.  The Board reasoned that 45 
C.F.R. § 304.50 merely restates Title IV-D's requirement that 
fees collected from services provided under a state's Child 
Support Enforcement plan are income that must be excluded from 
any claim for federal funding.  The Board concluded that the JCP 
fees in dispute "were charged as initial filing fees in 
conjunction with IV-D child support cases" and thus "directly 
generated by IV-D services."  (App. 20a)  The Board also noted 
that the Commonwealth treats other court filing fees received in 
connection with IV-D services as program income.  (App. 181a-
182a).  Accordingly, the Board upheld the disallowances.   
 The Board relied in part upon its own precedent to reject 
the Commonwealth's claim that 45 C.F.R. § 74.41(c)(1) applies to 
this case.  At the time of the Board's decision, that regulation 
stated: "[r]evenues raised by a government recipient under its 
governing powers, such as taxes, special assessments, levies, and 
fines" are not considered program income.  45 C.F.R. §74.41(c)(1) 
(1993).  The parties stipulated that the JCP fees at issue 
constituted "special assessments", but the Board ruled that the 
more restrictive income exclusion provision of the statute takes 
precedence over the general language of the regulation. See 42 
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U.S.C. § 655(a)(1).  The Board concluded that "the proper focus 
is on the receipt of income from grant-related activities, not on 
how the funds are expended."  App. at 23a.   
 Nor did the Board believe that 45 C.F.R. § 304.21(b)(1) 
supported the Commonwealth's position.  That regulation provides 
that federal funding is not available for court filing fees 
unless the court participating in the cooperative agreement with 
the state IV-D agency ordinarily pays such fees itself.  The 
Board found that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence 
that either the Department of Public Welfare or the Domestic 
Relations Sections pay court filing fees; rather, the Board 
concluded that the fees are paid by the litigants.  After its 
original ruling, the Board upheld an additional disallowance of 
$24,861 in federal funding to the Commonwealth on the same 
grounds.   
B. Proceedings Before the District Court 
 The Commonwealth subsequently filed a complaint in the 
district court seeking judicial review of the Appeals Board's 
decision upholding the disallowances.  In that complaint, the 
Commonwealth also sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the 
ground that the members of the Appeals Board were appointed in 
violation of both the Appointments Clause of the United States 
Constitution and civil service laws and regulations.  The 
district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on all 
counts, and denied a Commonwealth motion for remand to allow the 
Appeals Board to consider a belatedly discovered HHS policy 
memorandum.  The court held that the agency's construction of the 
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statute at issue is entitled to deference and that the Board's 
rulings were based on a reasonable construction of that statute. 
The court refused to find that the Board's composition was 
improper.  This appeal followed.  
 
II. Discussion  
A. The Appointments Clause 
 
 The Commonwealth first contends that the members of the HHS 
Appeals Board were appointed in violation of the Appointments 
Clause of the United States Constitution. The Appointments Clause 
provides as follows: 
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges 
of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established 
by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, 
or in the Heads of Departments. 
 
U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
 Thus, the Appointments Clause divides all officers into two 
classes: principal officers and inferior officers. Only the 
former are appointed subject to the advise and consent of the 
Senate. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988). 
Accordingly, our inquiry must begin with an analysis of the 
nature of Board membership and a determination of whether the 
members are "principal officers" or "inferior officers."  See 
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 878 
(1991).   
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 However, since employees and lesser functionaries are not 
subject to the Appointments Clause, see id. at 880, we must 
determine if Appeals Board members are "officers" or "employees" 
for purposes of that Clause.  "[A]ny appointee exercising 
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States 
is an `Officer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be 
appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of Article II." 
See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.  Title 45 C.F.R. § 16.13, entitled 
"Powers and responsibilities," sets forth the authority of the 
members of the Appeals Board. It provides:  
 
In addition to powers specified elsewhere in these 
procedures, Board members have the power to issue 
orders (including "show cause" orders); to examine 
witnesses; to take all steps necessary for the conduct 
of an orderly hearing; to rule on requests and motions, 
including motions to dismiss; to grant extensions of 
time for good reasons; to dismiss for failure to meet 
deadlines and other requirements; to close or suspend 
cases which are not ready for review; to order or 
assist the parties to submit relevant information; to 
remand a case for further action by the respondent; to 
waive or modify these procedures in a specific case 
with notice to the parties; to reconsider a Board 
decision where a party promptly alleges a clear error 
of fact or law; and to take any other action necessary 
to resolve disputes in accordance with the objectives 
of these procedures.  As will become apparent, the 
broad discretion vested in Appeals Board members and 
the substantive duties that they perform.  
 
45 C.F.R. Part 16, Appendix A.  The broad discretion and 
authority vested in the Board clearly establishes that its 
members are officers and not employees, and the Board does not 
argue to the contrary. 
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 Accordingly, we must address whether the Appeals Board 
members are "principal" or "inferior" officers.  "The line 
between `inferior' and `principal' officers is one that is far 
from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where 
it should be drawn."  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671 (citation 
omitted).  However, the Supreme Court has identified several 
factors that guide our inquiry. These include: (1) the scope of 
the officer's duties; (2) the scope of the officer's authority; 
(3) the length of the officer's tenure; and (4) whether the 
officer is subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch 
official.  See Id. at 671-672. 
 In Morrison, the Court considered each of these factors and 
concluded that an independent counsel appointed under the Ethics 
in Government Act was an inferior officer.  The independent 
counsel had been appointed by a Special Division of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 591 et seq.  
Briefly stated, [that statute] allows for the 
appointment of an independent counsel to 
investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute 
certain high-ranking Government officials for 
violations of federal criminal laws. 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.  The independent counsel was given 
"full power and independent authority to exercise all 
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the 
Department of Justice." Id. at 662.  In addition, the authority 
of the Attorney General to remove the independent counsel was 
drastically curtailed and the independent counsel was given the 
power to seek judicial review of any attempted removal.  See 28 
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U.S.C. §§ 596(a)(1).  Nevertheless, despite the broad authority, 
discretion, and independence of the independent counsel, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the position was an inferior office 
under the Appointments Clause.  First, the independent counsel 
was "subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official," 
i.e. the Attorney General. This suggested that the independent 
counsel was "to some degree `inferior' in rank and authority." 
Morrison 487 U.S. at 671.  Second, the counsel was "empowered by 
the Act to perform only certain, limited duties," which did "not 
include any authority to formulate policy."  Id. at 671.  Third, 
the counsel's office was limited in jurisdiction to certain 
federal officials suspected of certain serious federal crimes. 
Lastly, the counsel's office was limited in tenure because the 
appointment did not extend beyond the completion of the 
investigation and prosecution for which the counsel was 
appointed.  Id. at 672. 
 The Commonwealth argues that application of the Morrison 
factors requires a conclusion that Appeals Board members are 
principal officers.  In so arguing, the Commonwealth stresses the 
scope of the Board members' authority.  "Indeed, the jurisdiction 
of the Appeals Board is broader than that of some of the 
specialized Article II Federal courts like that of the Court of 
International Trade.  28 U.S.C. §§ 251, 1581."  Appellant's Brief 
at 19-21.  The Commonwealth also stresses that much of the 
Board's jurisdiction is statutory and thus beyond the reach of 
the Secretary.  "[W]hile it is true that the Secretary can 
withdraw most of the authority granted to the Appeals Board, she 
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cannot withdraw the Appeals Board's statutory jurisdiction.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 608(j)".  Appellant's Brief at 19-21.  Finally, the 
Commonwealth argues that the tenure of the Board members supports 
principal officer status.  The parties have stipulated that Board 
members will serve indefinitely unless removed for misconduct. 
While conceding that the Secretary has the power to remove 
members, the Commonwealth argues that exclusive reliance on the 
removal criteria would classify virtually all Executive Branch 
officials, except the President and his cabinet, as inferior 
officers. 
 Defendants contend that the Commonwealth grossly inflates 
the duties and authority of the Appeals Board.   
Appeals Board review is not available, however, in 
civil rights cases and matters in which a statute 
requires a formal hearing under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 554, 
or some other hearing process.  45 C.F.R. pt. 16, App. 
A, § F.  The Board is also 'bound by all applicable 
laws and regulations,' 45 C.F.R. 16.14 -- i.e., it 
applies, rather than makes, agency policy.  See App. 
47a (stipulation) (Board members are not in 
confidential or policy-making positions).  The 
Commonwealth's claim that the Board's authority 
'supersedes even that of the Secretary of HHS herself 
is thus preposterous. 
 
Appellees' Brief at 20-21.  Further, defendants point out that 
"Appeals Board members may be removed by the Secretary for 
unacceptable performance or cause" and that the Secretary retains 
discretion to terminate or reassign all but a few of the Appeals 
Board's functions.  Appellees' Brief at 21.   
 We agree that the Appeals Board members are not principal 
officers.  Like the independent prosecutors in Morrison, the 
Appeals Board members are subject to removal by a higher 
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Executive Branch official, i.e. the Secretary of HHS.  Although 
there are some restrictions on the Secretary's ability to remove 
Board members, the Secretary's ability is not nearly as 
restricted as that of the Attorney General in Morrison, and the 
Board members have no statutory authorization to bring a civil 
action challenging their removal as did the special prosecutor in 
Morrison.  Furthermore, although the term of service on the Board 
is not restricted in duration, the Secretary may remove a member 
for cause or misconduct at any time, and the Board's powers and 
responsibilities are limited by regulation.  Finally, and perhaps 
most significantly, the Secretary could altogether eliminate the 
powers of the Board that are at issue here.  
 It is true that the Secretary cannot withdraw the Appeals 
Board's statutory jurisdiction.  See 42 U.S.C. § 608(j) 
(providing for HHS Appeals Board review of Title IV-A 
disallowance decisions made by a Quality Control panel).  The 
Commonwealth relies upon Freytag to argue that if Board members 
are principal officers for purposes of deciding statutory 
jurisdiction cases, then they are principal officers for all 
purposes.  However, reliance on Freytag is misplaced.   
 There, a statute authorized the Chief Judge of the Tax Court 
to appoint special trial judges and to assign them four 
categories of cases.  These categories included: (1) any 
declaratory judgment proceeding, (2) any proceeding under § 7463 
of the Internal Revenue Code, (3) any proceeding in which the 
deficiency or claimed overpayment did not exceed $10,000, and (4) 
any other proceeding which the Chief Judge may designate. 
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Freytag, 501 U.S. at 873.  In the first three categories, the 
special trial judge possessed the authority to render a final 
decision, however, in the fourth category, the special judge 
could only issue proposed findings and recommend a disposition. 
The Commissioner of the IRS conceded that the special trial 
judges were inferior officers for purposes of the first three 
categories of cases, but argued that the judges were "employees" 
for the fourth category because the trial judges' duties were 
significantly curtailed in that category.  Id. at 882.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument reasoning that: 
[t]he fact that an inferior officer on occasion 
performs duties that may be performed by an employee 
not subject to the Appointments Clause does not 
transform his [or her] status under the Constitution. 
If a special trial judge is an inferior officer for 
purposes of [the first three categories of cases], he 
[or she] is an inferior officer within the meaning of 
the Appointments Clause and . . . must be properly 
appointed. 
Id. at 882.  Similarly we do not believe that the Appeals Board's 
statutory grant of jurisdiction to review funding disallowances 
of the Quality Control Board transforms the Board's members into 
principal officers.   
 The AFDC program is a public-assistance scheme established 
by federal statute.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1982).  The 
statutory scheme that gave birth to the AFDC program has been 
appropriately described as "mind-numbing in complexity."  N.Y. 
State Department of Social Services v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 360, 361 
(D.C. Cir. 1987).  "Under the program, the federal government 
makes grants to partially fund eligible state programs that 
provide cash assistance to low-income families with dependent 
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children."  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States, 752 
F.2d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1984).  Under section 608(j), the Board 
has quasi-appellate review over AFDC funding disallowance 
decisions made by a Quality Control Review Panel.  The quality 
control system for the program was created to minimize the number 
and amount of inappropriate payments made under the AFDC program. 
See 45 C.F.R. § 205.40(a).  However, while the Board functions as 
an adjudicatory body under § 608(j), Board members remain subject 
to removal by the Secretary of HHS.  Moreover, the Board's powers 
under § 608(j) are strictly limited by the statute and 
implementing regulations.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.40-205.43. 
Accordingly, the Board is powerless to review certain findings of 
the Quality Control Panel. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(j)(2).  Thus, the 
authority of the Board as a quasi-appellate body under § 608(j) 
is even more limited than the authority the Board has when 
reviewing a Title IV-D disallowance.   
 Of course, "[t]he nature of each government position must be 
assessed on its own merits," Silver, 951 F.2d at 1040. 
Nevertheless, if special trial judges of the Tax Court are not 
principal officers under Freytag, it is difficult to imagine how 
Appeals Board members could be principal officers given the 
limitations imposed by the foregoing statutory scheme.   
[S]pecial trial judges perform more than ministerial 
tasks.  They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on 
the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to 
enforce compliance with discovery orders.  In the 
course of carrying out these important functions, the 
special trial judges exercise significant discretion. 
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Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82.  Perhaps even more importantly, a 
special trial judge has the authority to render a final decision 
on any of the three specifically described proceedings set forth 
above.  
 Congress' grant of authority to the Chief Judge of the Tax 
Court to appoint special trial judges and assign them the 
categories of cases described above necessarily includes the 
concomitant power to remove them and/or to curtail their duties. 
As discussed earlier, the same is true here.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Appeals Board members are "inferior officers" 
for purposes of the Appointments Clause.     
 This does not, however, end our inquiry under the 
Appointments Clause.  The Commonwealth argues that even if the 
Appeals Board members are "inferior officers," their existence is 
still a violation of the Appointments Clause because no act of 
Congress specifically authorizes their appointment.  Appellant's 
Brief at 23.  The defendants contend that the Social Security Act 
provides the Secretary with the necessary authority.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 913.  This section provides, in pertinent part, that: 
the Secretary is authorized to appoint and fix the 
compensation of such officers and employees and to make 
such expenditures as may be necessary for carrying out 
the functions of the Secretary under this chapter.  The 
Secretary may appoint attorneys and experts without 
regard to the civil service laws. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 913.1  This authorization is consistent with the 
applicable portion of the Appointments Clause that states: "but 
                     
1
      At the time of the district court's decision, this 
provision was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 903. 
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the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior 
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."  U.S. Const. Art. 
II, § 2, cl. 2.  On its face, the language of this "excepting 
clause" does not require that a law specifically provide for the 
appointment of a particular inferior officer.  To the contrary, 
"the Constitution affords Congress substantial discretion to 
fashion appointments within the specified constraints."  Silver 
v. United States Postal Service, 951 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 
1991); see also Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1880) 
("[A]s the Constitution stands, the selection of the appointment 
power, as between the functionaries named, is a matter resting in 
the discretion of Congress."); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673 (same).  
  In recognition of the enormous scope of the Secretary's 
responsibilities, Congress gave the Secretary carte blanche to 
appoint individuals to assist her in carrying out these duties. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 913.  We do not believe that this grant of 
appointment authority runs afoul of the Appointments Clause. "The 
strict requirements of nomination by the President and 
confirmation by the Senate were not carried over to the 
appointment of inferior officers.  A degree of flexibility was 
thought appropriate in providing for the appointment of officers 
who, by definition, would have only inferior governmental 
authority."  Weiss v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 752, 765 (1994) 
(Souter, J., concurring).  Accountability is ensured and 
governmental power checked by Congress's assignment of appointing 
power to the highly accountable head of a federal department like 
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the HHS.  See id. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring) ("the Framers . 
. . structured the [appointment of inferior officers] to ensure 
accountability and check governmental power: any decision to 
dispense with presidential appointment and Senate confirmation is 
Congress's to make, not the President's, but Congress's authority 
is limited to assigning the appointing power to the highly 
accountable President or the heads of departments, or, where 
appropriate, to the courts of law."); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884, 
111 S.Ct. at 2631 ("The Framers understood . . . that by limiting 
the appointment power, they could ensure that those who wielded 
it were accountable to political force and the will of the people 
. . . Even with respect to `inferior Officers,' the Clause allows 
Congress only limited authority to devolve appointment power on 
the President, his heads of departments, and the courts of 
law."). 
 Moreover, requiring Congress to identify the HHS Appeals 
Board by name in its statutory grant of authority would be 
legislatively unworkable and defeat the purpose of the relaxed 
requirements for "inferior officer" appointments.  The Framers of 
the Constitution created the classification of "inferior 
officers" because they foresaw that "when offices became 
numerous, and sudden removals necessary," nomination by the 
President and confirmation by the Senate "might become 
inconvenient."  United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 
(1879).  The convenience afforded by inferior officer 
appointments would hardly be served if we were to require 
Congress to account for every potential inferior officer 
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appointment in its statutory grant of authority to the department 
head.  Here, the highly accountable department head has been 
given the discretion to fashion inferior officer appointments to 
fit her needs, and she has done so by appointing members to the 
HHS Appeals Board.  We hold that, in doing so, she acted within 
the scope of her authority under 42 U.S.C. § 913. 
 Notwithstanding this clear congressional grant of 
appointment authority, the Commonwealth argues that the Secretary 
of HHS has improperly used her ordinary appointment power to 
create an extraordinary tribunal.  Appellant's Brief at 24. The 
Commonwealth claims that the Appeals Board is not directly 
accountable to the political leadership because: (1) its members 
are civil service members who serve for life; (2) its members are 
only indirectly supervised; (3) the members' evaluations have 
nothing to do with cases before the Appeals Board; and (4) in 
many categories of cases, the Secretary cannot overturn the 
Appeals Board's decisions.  Appellant's Brief at 25.  
 Notwithstanding these considerations, the Appointments 
Clause does not hint that inferior officers must be as tightly 
tethered to the appointing entity or political leadership as the 
Commonwealth suggests.  Neither Morrison nor Freytag suggests 
that inferior officers must have a certain level of supervision 
and political accountability in order to survive constitutional 
scrutiny. To the contrary, in Morrison, the Court specifically 
stated: "the [Ethics in Government] Act simply does not give the 
Division the power to `supervise' the independent counsel in the 
exercise of his or her prosecutorial authority." 487 U.S. at 681. 
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Common sense establishes that supervision and political 
accountability in the sense used by the Commonwealth are 
antithetical to the concept of both an independent counsel in 
Morrison and a judge in Freytag.  Requiring a prosecutor to be 
directly supervised by, and accountable to, the very persons he 
or she may be charged with investigating and prosecuting would 
make a mockery of the authority the Supreme Court sought to 
preserve and ratify in Morrison.  Similarly, the concept of 
supervision and dependence is wholly inconsistent with the notion 
of a judge in Freytag.  
 Furthermore, a requirement that an inferior officer be 
subject to direct supervision of the appointing entity, as the 
Commonwealth suggests, is at odds with the very test for 
"officer" status under the Appointments Clause.  That clause 
vests such status in "any appointee exercising significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."  Freytag, 
501 U.S. at 881.  It stands to reason that the level of 
supervision imposed on the appointee and the appointee's 
authority are inversely related.  See United States v. Boeing 
Co., 9 F.3d 743, 758 (1993) (holding that the authority exercised 
by qui tam "realtors" or "informers" who bring suit under the 
False Claims Act is not so "significant" that it must only be 
exercised by officers appointed in the manner prescribed by the 
Appointments Clause because the Executive Branch retains 
"sufficient control" over the realtors).   
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 Finally, the Commonwealth's reliance on 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a) 
is misplaced.2  This provision merely defines "officer" for 
purposes of Title 5 of the United States Code, entitled 
"Government Organization and Employees."  See 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a). 
It has no relevance to "officer" status under the Appointments 
Clause, and thus, its reference to "supervision" certainly cannot 
be read to restrict the appointment authority conferred by 
Article II.  Appellees' Brief at 25.  Therefore, we hold that the 
Appointments Clause is not violated because the Secretary's 
general appointment power under 42 U.S.C. § 913 authorizes the 
appointment of Appeals Board members. 
 
B. Civil Service Regulations 
 The Commonwealth argues that even if the appointment of 
Appeals Board members was constitutional, their appointment 
                     
2
  Section 2104, in relevant part, states as follows: 
 (a) For the purpose of this title, "officer", except as 
otherwise provided by this section or when specifically modified, 
means a justice or judge of the United States and an individual 
who is-- 
   (1) required by law to be appointed in the civil service 
   by one of the following acting in an official capacity-- 
  (A) the President; 
  (B) a court of the United States; 
  (C) the head of an Executive agency; or 
  (D) the Secretary of a military department; 
   (2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under 
   authority of law or an Executive act; and 
   (3) subject to the supervision of an authority named by 
   paragraph (1) of this section, or the Judicial Conference 
       of the United States, while engaged in the performance of 
       the duties of his office. 
 
   5 U.S.C. § 2104 
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violated relevant civil service laws (except for the chairperson 
whose appointment is not challenged on these grounds). 
Accordingly, in the Commonwealth's estimation, the Board had no 
statutory power to act.  Defendants contend that this argument 
has been waived since the Commonwealth never raised it before the 
Board.  In addition, defendants argue that the Secretary's 
decision to appoint excepted service attorneys to the Appeals 
Board is a matter of nonreviewable agency discretion.  
 The Supreme Court has held that an issue is nonreviewable 
only in rare instances "where the relevant statute is drawn so 
that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to 
judge the agency's exercise of discretion."  Lincoln v. Vigil, 
113 S.Ct. 2024, 2030-31 (1993).  Here, we can examine the 
relevant statutes and regulations to determine whether they grant 
the Secretary the appointment authority she utilized.  Moreover, 
we retain the discretion "to hear issues not raised in earlier 
proceedings when special circumstances warrant an exception to 
the general rule" that would otherwise result in a waiver.  State 
of New Jersey Dept. of Ed. v. Hufstedler, 724 F.2d 34, 36 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1983).  Such "special circumstances" exist here because the 
Office of Personnel Management explicitly advised Pennsylvania 
that non-SES Appeals Board positions were "in competitive 
service."  (App. at 13a).  The Commonwealth learned that OPM's 
statement was erroneous only after suit was filed in the district 
court.  Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to allow the 
Commonwealth's reliance on the OPM's erroneous information to 
prejudice the Commonwealth to the extent of not now considering 
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the merits of its position.  Thus, we will reach the merits of 
the Commonwealth's position. 
 "Civil service" is defined as all Federal appointive 
positions except uniformed services.  5 U.S.C. § 2101.  The civil 
service is composed of the "competitive service," the "excepted 
service," and the "senior Executive Service."  See 5 U.S.C. 
§§2102, 2103.  All Executive Branch appointive positions not 
requiring Senate confirmation and not in the Senior Executive 
Service are to be in the competitive service unless "specifically 
excepted from the competitive service by or under statute."  5 
U.S.C. § 2102.  Congress authorized the President, when warranted 
by "conditions of good administration," to make "necessary 
exceptions of positions from the competitive service" within the 
executive branch.  5 U.S.C. § 3302.  Subsequently, the President 
delegated this authority to the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM).  Exec.Order No. 10577, 5 C.F.R. § 6.1(a).  OPM thereafter 
divided excepted service positions into three categories: 
Schedules A, B, and C.  5 C.F.R. § 6.2.  Schedule A, which allows 
exception of "positions other than those of a confidential or 
policy-determining character for which it is impracticable to 
examine," 5 C.F.R. § 213.3101, specifically includes "attorneys." 
5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d).  Here, the parties have stipulated that 
the Schedule A "attorney appointment" authority was utilized to 
appoint the challenged members of the Appeals Board. Accordingly, 
the essential dispute is straightforward.  
 In effect, defendants contend that Schedule A specifically 
provides for the appointment of "attorneys" to the Appeals Board 
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without regard to the competitive service requirements of the 
civil service laws.  The Commonwealth disagrees.  It believes 
that members of the Appeals Board cannot be hired pursuant to the 
"attorney appointment" power of Schedule A since, in reality, 
these attorneys function as administrative law judges.  See 
Appellant's Brief at 28-30.  For the following reasons, we cannot 
agree with the Commonwealth. 
 Schedule A imposes two limitations on the "attorney 
appointment" authority.  Under the OPM regulation, such authority 
is limited to "positions other than those of a confidential or 
policy-determining character for which it is impracticable to 
examine."  5 C.F.R. §§ 213.3101.  Here, the Commonwealth does not 
question the OPM's determination that "attorneys" may be 
appointed under Schedule A authority.  Rather, the Commonwealth 
challenges the Board members' designation as "attorneys." 
Accordingly, we must return to the function of the Board.    
 The Appeals Board reviews final written decisions in a 
narrowly specified range of disputes arising from HHS programs. 
See 45 C.F.R. Pt. 16, App. A.  In resolving these disputes, Board 
members are authorized to engage in diverse legal and quasi-
judicial tasks.  Some of these tasks include examining witnesses 
and evidence, holding hearings and informal conferences, 
assisting parties to submit relevant information and to rule on 
requests and motions.  See 45 C.F.R. § 16.13.  However, contrary 
to the Commonwealth's assertions, no authority exists for the 
proposition that Appeals Board members function as administrative 
law judges.  Congress granted administrative law judges ("ALJ") 
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the authority to conduct formal hearings in accordance with 
sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
("APA").3  By contrast, the Appeals Board has no authority to 
review any dispute for which a formal hearing is required under 
the APA.  45 C.F.R. Pt. 16, App. A, § F.  Instead, the Board 
provides a mechanism for reviewing the category of HHS disputes 
not otherwise designated by Congress for formal adjudication 
pursuant to either 5 U.S.C. § 554, Title VII or some other 
statutory scheme.  Id.  Accordingly, we must reject any attempt 
to analogize the Board members to administrative law judges.   
 We believe the Schedule A "attorney appointment" power 
clearly extends to the challenged members of the Appeals Board. 
Nothing in the relevant statutory or regulatory scheme restricts 
the Secretary's appointment of attorneys, under Schedule A, to 
perform the tasks assigned to the Appeals Board.  Title 5 U.S.C. 
§ 3106 merely restricts the employment of "an attorney or counsel 
for the conduct of litigation."  Since 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d) 
specifically exempts the challenged members from the competitive 
service requirements of the civil service laws, we conclude that 
the Board was not divested of its authority to act.   
   Accordingly, we affirm the district court's holding that the 
Secretary's appointment of excepted service attorneys to the 
                     
3
  5 U.S.C. § 3105.  The hearing sections of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 
§556-557, are applicable, with exceptions, when a rule is 
required by statute to be made on the record after an agency 
hearing; when an adjudication is required by statute to be 
determined on the record after an agency hearing; or when the 
requirement of a hearing is read into a statute to preserve its 
constitutionality.   
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Appeals Board did not run afoul of civil service statutes and 
regulations.  
 
E. Program Income 
 The Commonwealth contends that even if the Appeals Board 
members were lawfully appointed, the Board and the district court 
erred in finding that the JCP fee is "program income" which must 
be excluded from reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1). 
Section 655(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
In determining the total amounts expended by any State 
during a quarter, for purposes of this subsection, 
there shall be excluded an amount equal to the total of 
any fees collected or other income resulting from 
services provided under the plan approved under this 
part. 
 
The Commonwealth claims that the phrase "resulting from services 
provided under the plan approved under this part" is ambiguous. 
Appellant's Brief at 31.   
One possible reading of the "resulting from" language 
is that it qualifies both "fees collected" and "other 
income."  A second possible reading of the language 
applies the doctrine of the last antecedent to limit 
the "resulting from" language so that it qualifies only 
the "other income" prong of § 655(a). 
 
Id.  
 
 HHS has promulgated 45 C.F.R. § 304.50, entitled "Treatment 
of Program Income."  That regulation states: 
 
The IV-D agency must exclude from its quarterly 
expenditure claims an amount equal to: 
 
(a) All fees which are collected during the quarter 
under the Title IV-D State Plan; and 
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(b) All interest and other income earned during the 
quarter resulting from services provided under the 
 Title IV-D plan. 
 
45 C.F.R. § 304.50.  The Appeals Board construed the regulation 
as restating the statute's requirement.  The Board reasoned that, 
"[i]n order to be collected under the plan, fees must necessarily 
be collected from services provided under the plan."  Appeals 
Board Decision p. 6. Thus, in its estimation, the proper focus is 
on the receipt of income from grant related activities, not on 
how the funds are spent.  Moreover, the Board suggested that "the 
underlying reason for this appeal appears to be the IV-D agency's 
frustration with the fact that the income from the fees is not 
available for use for IV-D program purposes, yet treating the 
fees as [program] income reduces the amount of [federal financial 
participation] available."  Appeals Board Decision p. 5 n.4  The 
Commonwealth accurately describes this practical problem that 
results from the Board's interpretation of "program income." 
However, as the Board appropriately noted, "[t]his problem 
results from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's own action of 
earmarking the funds for JCP purposes. . .and could be remedied 
by state legislative action."  Id.  The district court found the 
Board's construction of 45 C.F.R. § 304.50 and 42 U.S.C. 
§655(a)(1) to be reasonable and therefore entitled to deference.   
 The parties dispute the extent to which the Appeals Board's 
construction of 42 U.S.C. § 655(a) and 45 C.F.R. § 304.50 is 
entitled to deference.  The defendants, citing Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
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(1984) and Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 
2386 (1994), claim we owe deference to an administrative agency's 
construction of a statute and its implementing regulations.  The 
Commonwealth cites to cases holding that when a Board functions 
as an adjudicatory tribunal and does not make rules or formulate 
policy, its interpretation is not entitled to any special 
deference.  See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (reviewing court should defer to 
Secretary of Labor when Secretary and Board furnish reasonable 
but conflicting interpretations of ambiguous regulation 
promulgated by the Secretary under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act); Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 
1994) (Department of Labor Benefits Review Board acts as 
adjudicatory tribunal and does not make rules or formulate 
policy, and thus its interpretation of regulation is not entitled 
to any special deference).  We need not decide the level of 
deference owed to an HHS Appeals Board decision, because the 
Board's interpretation of 45 C.F.R. § 304.50(a) and 42 U.S.C. 
§655(a)(1), withstands even plenary review. 
 Section 655(a)(1) is clear on its face.  However, to the 
extent the regulation detracts from the clear import of this 
statute, the statute must, of course, prevail. See McComb v. 
Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 481 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[I]n any conflict 
between a statute and a regulation purporting to implement the 
statutes provision, the regulation must, of course, give way."); 
60 Key Centre, Inc. v. Administrator of General Services Admin., 
47 F.3d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) ("When . . . a regulation operates 
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to create a rule out of harmony with the statute under which it 
is promulgated, the regulation is considered a nullity."). 
However, even if the regulation here has unintentionally clouded 
an otherwise unambiguous statute, we do not believe that the 
statute and regulation conflict.  See LaVallee Northside Civic 
Assoc. v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Commission, 866 
F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1989) (before disregarding a regulation a court 
must first attempt to reconcile a seemingly discordant statute 
and regulation).  As the Appeals Board reasoned, fees "collected 
. . . under the Title IV-D plan" must necessarily "result from 
services provided under the [Title IV-D] plan."  Appeals Board 
Decision at 6.  Therefore, under both the statute and the 
regulation, funds which would not have been generated absent a 
state's Title IV-D services constitute "program income" not 
subject to federal reimbursement. 
 Here, the JCP fee is directly generated by IV-D services. 
The Commonwealth collects an extra $5 from either the parent 
requesting the IV-D services or the parent legally obligated to 
pay IV-D child support when such a case is filed.  This fact is 
not negated merely because the Commonwealth itself has chosen to 
use the JCP fee in a manner that does not enhance the Child 
Support Enforcement program in Pennsylvania.  Clearly, the 
Commonwealth may allocate income derived from the JCP fee in any 
manner it chooses.  However, under this statutory scheme, its 
decision as to how to utilize the income from the fee has no 
bearing on federal reimbursement for Title IV-D services.  
31 
 The Commonwealth raises an additional argument, relying on 
45 C.F.R. § 74.41(c).  That regulation pre-dated 42 U.S.C. 
§655(a)(1).  When the district court granted summary judgment for 
the defendants, §74.41(c) (which governs all HHS grant programs) 
provided, in pertinent part, that: 
The following shall not be considered program income: 
 
(1) Revenues raised by a government recipient under its 
governing powers, such as taxes, special assessments, 
levies and fines . . .  
 
45 C.F.R. § 74.41(c).  The Commonwealth contends that the JCP fee 
is a "special assessment" within the meaning of § 74.41(c)(1) and 
therefore need not be considered program income.  However, 
§74.41(c)(1) does not apply when it is "inconsistent with Federal 
statutes [or] regulations."  45 C.F.R. § 74.4(a).  Since we 
uphold the Board's interpretation of 45 C.F.R. § 304.50(a) and 42 
U.S.C. § 655(a)(1), § 74.41(c)(1) is inapplicable here because it 
directly conflicts with § 304.50(a) and § 655(a)(1).  
 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's conclusion that 
the JCP fee is program income as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1) 
and 45 C.F.R. § 304.50(a), and thus, may not be reimbursed with 
federal funds.       
 
F. New Evidence 
 The Commonwealth's final contention is that we should 
"remand so that the Appeals Board can consider new evidence 
uncovered in HHS's belated response to the Commonwealth's Freedom 
of Information Act ("FOIA") request."  Appellant's Brief at 36. 
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We will treat the Commonwealth's motion for a remand to the 
Appeals Board as a motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence, and therefore, review the district court's 
denial of the Commonwealth's motion for an abuse of discretion. 
See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1362, 1364 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,    
U.S.    , 114 S.Ct. 650 (1993) (motion for new trial reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion).  The purported new evidence is a 1988 
policy memorandum (PIQ-88-5) issued by HHS' Office of Child 
Support Enforcement.  The memorandum states that interest earned 
by North Carolina county courts on child support collections, 
before being forwarded to the state's IV-D agency, is not program 
income because the county courts are not under cooperative 
agreements with the State IV-D agency, and thus, are not bound by 
state and federal IV-D regulations. 
 The district court denied the remand motion because "PIQ-88-
5 can be distinguished from the facts presented here, as DPW 
administers its Title IV-D program through cooperative agreements 
with all of Pennsylvania's judicial districts, and the JCP fee is 
collected by the Pennsylvania Domestic Relations Section of the 
Court of Common Pleas."  We agree.  The Commonwealth also 
suggests that a previously undisclosed 1989 Federal Register 
statement is new evidence that warrants a remand.  However, by 
definition, a Federal Register notice is public.  We are at a 
loss to understand how such public information should be viewed 
as "new evidence" justifying a remand merely because the 
Commonwealth's initial research apparently somehow failed to find 
it.  
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 The district court acted well within its discretion in 
refusing to remand this case to the Appeals Board.  PIQ memoranda 
are fact-specific policy documents, not intended to apply 
broadly, and are due less weight than regulations.  Simply 
stated, they are not binding precedent on the Appeals Board. 
Finally, even if PIQ-88-5 had some precedential value, we agree 
with the district court's conclusion that the case before us is 
distinct and the memorandum was, therefore, of little value to 
the Appeals Board.  
  Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the 
Commonwealth's motion for a remand to the Appeals Board.  
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed.   
